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Indistinguishable from Magic: A
Wizard’s Guide to Copyright and 3D
Printing
James Grimmelmann*
“Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable
from magic.”1

The defining characteristic of a 3D printer is that it turns
bits into stuff. This causal connection between the world of
thoughts and the world of things is more than a little uncanny.
3D printing is a technology of such surprise and wonder that it
verges on the magical.
It is also, Kyle Dolinsky argues, a problem for copyright law.2
The heart of his Note is a search for analogies to CAD files in
copyright case law. He works methodically through architectural
plans, technical drawings, recipes, and computer programs3—all
things that consist of instructions for making other things. These
analogies have something else in common, too: they’re difficult,
contested ground in copyright, which has never dealt cleanly with
multiple media or multiple layers of meaning.
This bad news is also good news. 3D printing is as hard as
some of the most notoriously difficult parts of copyright—but it is
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of
Law. My thanks to Aislinn Black and Tony Reese for comments and to Jordan
Reth for research assistance. This essay is available for reuse under the
Creative
Commons
Attribution
4.0
International
license,
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
1. Arthur C. Clarke, Hazards of Prophecy: The Failure of the Imagination,
in PROFILES OF THE FUTURE: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LIMITS OF THE POSSIBLE 12, 21
n.1 (rev. ed. 1973).
2. See generally Kyle A. Dolinsky, Note, CAD’s Cradle: Untangling
Copyrightability, Derivative Works, and Fair Use in 3D Printing, 71 WASH. &
LEE L. REV 591 (2014).
3. See id. at 629–42 (comparing CAD files to these other types of works
and concluding that all of the analogies are imperfect).
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also no harder. To the extent that the copyright system is capable
of resolving these other controversial cases, it is also capable of
resolving 3D printing cases. To see why, it helps to abstract away
from the details of 3D printing itself. Instead, let us start from
the wisdom of Clarke’s Third Law4: that beyond a certain point,
the technological details no longer matter. What if 3D printers
actually are magic?
I. Introduction
Ulrich has a Replicio wand. When he waves it with the right
flick of his wrist, it makes a perfect duplicate of the object he
waves it at.
The copyright treatment of the Replicio wand is simple.
When Ulrich uses it to duplicate an object, he has created a
“copy.”5 His only good argument that his copy is noninfringing
will be that the object is not subject to copyright in the first
place.6 The strength of this argument depends on what the object
is. A first-century bust of Homer is in the public domain;7
duplicating it with my wand violates no one’s rights. A twentyfirst-century bust of Homer Simpson is copyrighted; duplicating it
with the wand makes me an infringer.
There is nothing special about three-dimensional objects in
this respect.8 If Ulrich waves the wand at Rembrandt’s two4. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (“Any sufficiently advanced
technology is indistinguishable from magic.”).
5. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “copies” as “material objects . . . in
which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from
which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device”).
6. See id. § 106(1) (providing that, except for fair use and other
limitations, the owner of a valid copyright has the exclusive right to “reproduce
the copyrighted work in copies”).
7. Such a bust would have been created and published before 1978, so it
would be protected, if at all, under § 304 of the 1976 Copyright Act’s provisions
for “subsisting” copyrights. See id. § 304 (defining the copyright term for a
“subsisting” work). But because an ancient bust would have been published
without complying with the formalities of the 1909 Act, it would not be subject
to copyright under the 1976 Act either.
8. See id. § 101 (defining “[p]ictorial, graphic, and sculptural works”); id.
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dimensional public-domain painting Aristotle Contemplating a
Bust of Homer, his duplicate will not infringe. To be sure, some
three-dimensional objects are uncopyrightable for a distinctive
reason: because they are “useful articles” whose practical aspects
are inseparable from their aesthetic features,9 such as bicycle
racks10 and casino uniforms.11 But to understand the Replicio
wand, we need to know only whether a three-dimensional object
is copyrighted; nothing turns on why.
Thus, if we are capable of deciding which three-dimensional
objects are copyrighted—a question to which copyright law
already purports to have an answer—we are capable of saying
that using a 3D printer to duplicate them infringes. Like the
wand, it reproduces every last scrap of expression; a duplicate
infringes if and only if the initial object was copyrightable.12 This
is not by any means an easy question, but it is no harder than
current copyright doctrine.
II.
3D printing is not, however, quite this simple. 3D printers do
not work directly from objects any more than regular 2D printers
work directly from books. Instead, 3D printers start from
specialized CAD files: the 3D equivalents of PDFs.13
§ 102(a)(5) (making them protectable).
9. See id. § 101 (defining “useful article[s]” as objects “having an intrinsic
utilitarian function” and excluding them from protection unless “such design
incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified
separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian
aspects of the article”).
10. See Brandir Int’l v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1147–48
(2d Cir. 1987) (concluding that a bicycle rack lacked a creative element
separable from its functionality and was therefore uncopyrightable).
11. See Galiano v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc., 416 F.3d 411, 422 (5th Cir.
2005) (concluding that casino uniform designs were uncopyrightable because
any ornamental details were not separable from their utilitarian functions).
12. See, e.g., id. at 413 (“To prove copyright infringement, a plaintiff must
show ownership of a valid copyright and actionable copying.”).
13. See Dolinsky, supra note 2, at 600 (comparing the STL format to the 3D
version of a PDF) (quoting Michael Weinberg, What’s the Deal with Copyright and
3D Printing?, PUB. KNOWLEDGE 14 (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.publicknowledge.org/
files/What’s%20the%20Deal%20with%20Copyright_%20Final%2version2.pdf).
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The magical equivalent of a CAD file is a long scroll
containing an intricate spell. When read aloud, the scroll conjures
up an object. What kind of object depends on the spell: a chair
scroll makes a chair, a broom scroll makes a broom. Read a broom
scroll twice and you have two brooms.
When I use my Replicio wand to duplicate a bust of Homer
Simpson, I infringe. But what if Gandalf and Saruman break the
process into two steps? Gandalf makes a scroll to create busts of
Homer Simpson, and Saruman uses the scroll to make a bust. Are
these infringing “copies” of the initial bust?14
A.
Saruman’s case is simpler. Just as it doesn’t matter whether
I use a Replicio wand, a 3D printer, or hammer and chisel to
produce infringing Simpsons memorabilia, it doesn’t matter that
Saruman works from a scroll. At the end of the process, he has a
bust of Homer Simpson where none existed before. That bust is
still a copy; it still infringes. As before, Saruman is in trouble if
and only if the object Gandalf started from was copyrightable.
B.
Gandalf’s case is more interesting, but in the end the result
is the same. The apparent difficulty is that the scroll doesn’t look
like the object it describes. A chair scroll and a broom scroll are
far more similar in appearance than a chair and a broom. If you
showed me a scroll to make a bust of Homer Simpson, I wouldn’t
recognize it.
There was a time when copyright law distinguished between
a copy that humans would recognize and a copy they would not,
but that time was 1908. In that year, the Supreme Court held
that player piano rolls weren’t “copies” of the music encoded in
them, writing that “even those skilled in the making of these rolls
14. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “copies” as “material objects . . .
from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device”).
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are unable to read them as musical compositions.”15 Unlike sheet
music, which is “addressed to the eye,” piano rolls were only “part
of a machine.”16
Congress promptly obliterated the idea that mere
“mechanical reproductions” of music were immune from
copyright, creating a system of royalties for them in the
Copyright Act of 1909.17 Two years later, the Supreme Court held
that a celluloid film-stock version of Ben Hur infringed on the
book,18 and since then shifting between media has not generally
been a defense to a copyright lawsuit.19 The modern Copyright
Act explicitly repudiates the distinction between humanintelligible and technological copies. Today a “copy” infringes
whether it can be perceived “directly” or whether it requires “the
aid of a machine or device.”20 A 3D printer is just such a device.
Nor does it matter how the scroll is produced. Some wizards,
like Hermione Granger, are capable of taking an object and
writing out longhand the corresponding scroll to make another.
Others, more like Ron Weasley, prefer to use a Transcriptio wand
to make their scrolls for them. (The distinction, of course,
corresponds to the difference between hand-authored and
scanned CAD files.)21 Either way, the scroll is treated like the
object it makes: both of them infringe if the object they were
made from is copyrightable.

15. White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 18 (1908).
16. Id. at 12 (quoting Kennedy v. McTammany, 33 F. 584, 584 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1888)).
17. Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1974) (current version at 17
U.S.C. § 106(5)–(6) (2012)).
18. Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 62–63 (1911); see also Harper
& Bros. v. Kalem Co., 169 F. 61, 62 (2d Cir. 1909) (describing motion picture
technology).
19. See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349,
352–53 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (concluding that defendant infringed by converting tens
of thousands of CDs into MP3 files).
20. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). Reading a scroll aloud “reproduce[s]” the object
it describes; a 3D printer is a “machine or device” used to “reproduce[]” a CAD
file. Id.; see also Dolinsky, supra note 2, at 600–02 (describing the 3D printing
process).
21. See Dolinsky, supra note 2, at 600–01 (discussing the differences).
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Thus, despite the superficial difference between 2D and 3D,
copyright law treats these scrolls just like the objects they make.
The duplicate bust of Homer Simpson and the scroll that makes a
duplicate bust of Homer Simpson are both infringing “copies” of
the initial bust. The initial bust and the duplicate bust are both
sculptural works, while the scroll merely “portrays” a sculptural
work, but that makes no difference. All three contain the same
copyrightable expression. The unauthorized CAD file made from
a Homer Simpson bust infringes, even before you print out the
bust itself.
III.
But there is more. There is always more. So far, we have
been considering claims by the copyright owner of the initial
object against the team of Gandalf and Saruman. But what about
the copyright owners of scrolls? Suppose that Morgaine has
composed a scroll to make an object. Will copyright protect her
from pirate wizards?
A.
Merlin is crafty: he realizes that his Replicio wand works just
as well on scrolls as it does on busts.22 So even though no bust of
Homer Simpson is available for him to duplicate, Merlin is
undeterred. He simply uses his wand to duplicate Morgaine’s
bust-making scroll.
When challenged, Merlin might argue that he has copied
nothing copyrightable because Morgaine never had a bust of
22. As this example shows, the distinction between two and three
dimensions gives way when pressed. All objects are three-dimensional, and thus
so are all the copies of any work. Any particular copy of Aristotle Contemplating
a Bust of Homer, the original included, is a three-dimensional object. Calling it
“two-dimensional” is a way of saying the third dimension is irrelevant. The
expression in the words of a novel is independent of the thickness of the paper
they are printed on.
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Homer Simpson in the first place. But just as a bust of Homer
Simpson and a scroll describing a bust of Homer Simpson are
equally infringing, so too a bust and a scroll describing a bust are
equally protected as originals. Others infringe when they copy
it.23 As long as the object Morgaine had in mind was
copyrightable, Merlin’s copy of her scroll to create it infringes.
Again, there is nothing special about magic scrolls or 3D
printers. As long as something is copyrightable, sufficiently
detailed instructions for making it are copyrightable, too.
Architectural plans are copyrightable because buildings are.24
JPEG files are copyrightable because images are. It is true that
copyright does not protect functional material.25 But the
“functionality” of scrolls and CAD files is a red herring when their
function is to produce copyrightable objects. Saying that a CAD
file is functional to make a bust of Homer Simpson is like saying
that MP3 files are functional to make music. So they are: it is the
expression in the underlying busts and songs that makes the files
copyrightable in some hands and infringing in others.
B.
But this is not the end of the story because this is not the
only way that Morgaine’s scroll could be copyrightable. Suppose,
for example, that it has decorative flourishes that are completely
unrelated to the object it produces: swash caps and line drawings
of sea monsters in the margins.26
23. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“The term ‘copies’ includes the material object . . .
in which the work is first fixed by any method now known or later
developed . . . .”).
24. See id. (defining “architectural work[s]”); id. § 102(a)(8) (making them
protectable).
25. See, e.g., id. § 102(b) (“In no case does copyright protection . . . extend to
any . . . procedure, process, system, [or] method of operation . . . .”).
26. In Dolinsky’s taxonomy, the 3D printer equivalent would be decorative
touches in the design drawings used to produce the computer code in the CAD
files. See Dolinsky, supra note 2, at 647–48 (arguing that authorship and
copyrightability of computer code in a CAD file, respectively, will depend on the
extent to which CAD software programmers and CAD designers, respectively,
are responsible for recognizable segments of code).
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When a scroll contains decorative features that are wholly
incidental to what it does, the scroll itself is independently
expressive, like an antique map or an illuminated manuscript.27
Indeed, even if Morgaine’s artistic vision outstrips her magical
talent so that the scroll she writes is beautiful but does nothing
when read aloud, it is still a work of authorship—a “pictorial” or
“graphic” work, to be precise.28 A collector might hang it on her
wall for decoration, not even knowing what Morgaine intended it
to do.
If so, then Merlin will still infringe by duplicating the scroll—
even when the underlying object is uncopyrightable. The lowlevel CAD files used in 3D printers, however, tend not to have
this incidental kind of unrelated expression embedded in them.
They are like scrolls printed in a uniform mechanical typeface,
with no decorative features whatsoever.
C.
There is also a third way that Morgaine’s scroll could
implicate the kind of expression that copyright cares about. The
necessary originality to make it copyrightable could be found not
in the object it describes or in its purely decorative features, but
in the words it uses to describe the object. That is, the scroll is not
just a portrayal of a 3D sculptural work, and not just a 2D
pictorial work, but also a 1D literary work.
Different scrolls may use different words to do the same
thing. Morgaine and Gandalf will not describe a chair in the same
way; the scrolls they write out will have different instructions for
recreating it. When I read aloud from Morgaine’s scroll I will
speak different syllables than when I read from Gandalf’s scroll,
even though the chairs I end up with are identical in every way.
Does the difference in wording matter?
27. But see Zhang v. Heineken N.V., No. CV 08-6506 GAF (RCx), 2010 WL
4457460, at *5–6 (C.D. Cal. May 12, 2010) (concluding that work of Chinese
calligraphy was uncopyrightable).
28. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “pictorial” and “graphical” works);
id. § 102(a) (making copyrightable “original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression”).
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One approach to the question treats a chair scroll like a
photograph of the chair: both purport to represent the chair’s
appearance. In copyright terms, they are “derivative works”
based on the chair.29 Just as a photograph of an uncopyrightable
vodka bottle can be copyrightable because it embodies the
photographer’s choices “about lighting, shading, angle,
background, and so forth,”30 the scroll embodies Morgaine’s
choices about how to describe the chair.
Another approach inverts the question; it looks not to how a
scroll was made but to how it is to be used. The words on the
scroll, like the text of a computer program, are speech acts: they
cause something to happen when read in the right way. Whether
they are a proper subject of copyright is precisely the question
that Congress asked the Commission on New Technological Uses
(CONTU) to confront in the 1970s.31 CONTU recommended,32 and
Congress agreed,33 that computer programs should be protected
in this way—as literary works.34 The choice was and is
controversial, but the law is settled.35
Either way, if Morgaine’s scroll has distinctive wording,
Merlin the plagiarist will infringe. Of course, not all scrolls will
actually feature this kind of expression. Some will fall beneath
29. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “derivative work” as “a work based upon
one or more preexisting works” including any “form in which a work may be
recast, transformed, or adapted”); id. § 103(a) (making derivative works
copyrightable).
30. Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1077 (9th Cir. 2000).
31. See NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED
WORKS, FINAL REPORT 1 (1978) (noting that CONTU’s purpose was to address
the “problems raised by the use of the new technolog[y] of . . . computers”).
32. See id. at 9–12 (recommending copyright protection for computer
programs).
33. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “computer program”).
34. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d
1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983) (“Thus a computer program . . . is a ‘literary work’ and
is protected from unauthorized copying.”).
35. Compare, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against
Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984
DUKE L.J. 663, 703–53 (criticizing software copyright), with, e.g., Arthur R.
Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and ComputerGenerated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 977, 982–
85 (1993) (defending software copyright).
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the threshold of minimal originality: a scroll to make a cube is
likely to be completely generic.36 Others will involve no
meaningful human authorship, as where a particularly stodgy
wizard uses a Transcriptio wand to make a “slavish cop[y]” of the
chair in front of her.37 Still others will describe the object using
the same words that any other wizard would have to use to
describe it: a chair has “four” “legs” and not “five” “arms.” These
expressive details merge with the idea of describing a chair; they
too are uncopyrightable.38 And finally, the rules of magic will
sharply constrain the permissible descriptions of a chair; it would
hardly do for a chair-making scroll to contain a sequence of
syllables that summons up a herd of rampaging wildebeests. All
of these uncopyrightable elements will need to be filtered from
the scroll’s wording in assessing its overall copyrightability.39
D.
To summarize, a scroll might be copyrightable because it
makes a copyrightable object, because it uses copyrightable words
to describe the object, or because it adds copyrightable decoration
to those words. With CAD files, the first will be present
frequently, the second occasionally, and the third rarely. If any of
the three are present, those who copy the CAD file are infringers.

36. See, e.g., Yankee Candle Co., Inc. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., LLC, 259
F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 2001) (stating that “common geometric shapes” are
uncopyrightable, and collecting cases).
37. Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196
(S.D.N.Y. 1999). Yet again, nothing turns on the number of dimensions. There is
no more originality in a perfectly detailed scan of a car than in a perfectly
detailed photograph of a painting. See Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales
USA, Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1267 (10th Cir. 2008) (calling a scan of a 3D object “a
peculiar type of copying”).
38. See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 707–
08 (2d Cir. 1992) (explaining that elements dictated by efficiency are not
copyrightable because the potentially copyrightable expression has merged with
the uncopyrightable idea).
39. Cf. id. at 707–10 (describing the filtration step of the abstraction–
filtration–comparison test for computer software, in which the uncopyrightable
elements of code are filtered out).
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It does not make a major difference whether the chicken or
the egg comes first. Some wizards create scrolls “drawn from the
life”40 based on existing 3D objects. Others can work “entirely
from [their] own original mental conception”41 and compose a
scroll from scratch, a scroll that will produce an object whose like
has never before existed in the world. Obviously, a wizard who
works from a preexisting object cannot lay claim to the
copyrightable features of the object itself (unless she was also the
author of the object), but both she and the wizard who works from
scratch have a copyright in their choice of wording and any
decorative flourishes.42
IV.
There is one more important possibility. Consider Saruman
again, who reads aloud a scroll. Unlike Merlin, who duplicated
the scroll itself, Saruman never creates a potentially infringing
copy of the scroll. Certainly, he infringes if the object the scroll
describes is copyrightable. (Morgaine, who made the scroll, may
be the copyright owner of the object it describes, or she may not.

40. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithography Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903).
There, the Court concluded that works based on existing objects are not thereby
excluded from copyrightability. Id. at 252.
41. Burrow-Giles Lithography Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884).
42. In copyright terms, these works “portraying” a sculptural work are
copyrightable to the extent that they are original literary or pictorial works. See
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (requiring only originality and fixation in a tangible
medium for copyrightability). In practice, courts apply a heightened filter of
originality when the author starts from a preexisting work not of her own
making because of the need to distinguish the original features of the
underlying work from the original features of the work that portrays it. See, e.g.,
ATC Distrib. Grp. v. Whatever It Takes Transmissions & Parts, Inc., 402 F.3d
700, 712 (6th Cir. 2005) (requiring “great skill” or “substantial variation”
(quoting L. Batlin & Son v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 492 (2d Cir. 1976))); Entm’t
Research Grp. v. Genesis Creative Grp., 122 F.3d 1211, 1220 (9th Cir. 1997)
(requiring that the original aspects of the derivative work be more than trivial
and that the derivative does not affect the scope of the protection in the original)
(citing Durham Indus. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 909 (2d Cir. 1980); Alva
Studios, Inc. v. Winninger, 177 F. Supp. 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1959)).
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That affects only who has standing to sue Saruman, not whether
he infringes.43)
But, as we have seen, there are other ways a scroll could be
copyrightable besides simply depicting a copyrightable object. Its
decorative features as a pictorial or graphic work—its swoops and
whirls and marginalia—are irrelevant to Saruman. When he
reads the scroll’s words aloud, he will ignore the swash caps and
doodles. None of these details will end up in the object that
results. That object does not infringe because it is not
substantially similar to the scroll’s copyrightable elements: they
are copyrightable but not copied.
It might at first seem that the wording stands on the same
footing as the decorations. The bust of Homer Simpson
remembers neither the words used to make it nor what the scroll
they were written on looked like. There is no way to reconstruct
the scroll’s wording or flourishes no matter how closely you study
the bust. A wizard setting out to make a fresh scroll would have
to start from square one and would end up with a scroll that
resembled Morgaine’s scroll only by similarity of subject and by
coincidence—neither of which would suffice to infringe.
But the wording is different in one important way: Saruman
reads it aloud. This means that he “performs” the literary
features of the scroll by reading it.44 And if this recital takes place
before an assembled audience of orcs and wargs, it will be a
“public” performance and will infringe.45 If Saruman wishes to
steer clear of copyright danger, he will need to stay alone in his
study for a private performance.
Thus, there are important differences between Saruman, who
reads Morgaine’s scroll aloud to make a duplicate of the object it
describes, and Merlin, who makes a duplicate of the object itself.
43. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (providing that “[t]he legal or beneficial owner of
an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled” to sue for infringement of that
right).
44. See id. § 101 (“To ‘perform’ a work means to recite, render, play, dance,
or act it . . . .”).
45. See id. (defining “public[]” performances); id. § 106 (giving the copyright
owner the exclusive right to “perform the copyrighted work publicly”); id. § 101
(defining a public performance to be one “at a place open to the public or at any
place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a
family and its social acquaintances is gathered”).
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When that object is a bust of Homer rather than one of Homer
Simpson (in other words, it is not copyrighted), Saruman can read
the scroll aloud without implicating its copyrightable flourishes,
whereas Merlin necessarily copies those flourishes when he zaps
the scroll with a Replicio wand. The Copyright Act is far from a
model of clarity on this point,46 and so is the case law construing
it,47 but the courts generally have held that Saruman does not
infringe and Merlin might.48
Thus, in theory, users are free to print uncopyrightable 3D
objects from copyrightable CAD files without fear of infringing.
Courts tend to say that using technical diagrams to make an
uncopyrightable object does not infringe but that copying the
diagrams themselves does.49 If so, then woe betide the defendant
who makes a copy of the plaintiff’s copyrighted technical
drawings in order to manufacture the uncopyrightable useful
articles they describe.
This is, however, the point at which the magical analogy to
3D printing breaks down. People can read a scroll aloud without
46. These cases turn on one of the most obscure sentences in the 1976
Copyright Act:
This title does not afford, to the owner of copyright in a work
that portrays a useful article as such, any greater or lesser
rights with respect to the making, distribution, or display of
the useful article so portrayed than those afforded to such
works under the law, whether title 17 or the common law or
statutes of a State, in effect on December 31, 1977, as held
applicable and construed by a court in an action brought under
this title.
Id. § 113(b).
47. The general consensus is that the pre-1978 law carried forward by
§ 113(b) adopted the rule stated in the text. See, e.g., Gusler v. Fischer, 580 F.
Supp. 2d 309, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (explaining that plaintiff’s copyright in a
technical drawing does not prohibit defendants from manufacturing the article
that the drawing depicts).
48. Cf. Nat’l Med. Care, Inc. v. Espiritu, 284 F. Supp. 2d 424, 433–38 (S.D.
W. Va. 2003) (concluding that defendant’s cabinets did not infringe on plaintiff’s
copyright in a technical drawing of those cabinets).
49. See, e.g., Forest River, Inc. v. Heartland Recreational Vehicles, 753 F.
Supp. 2d 753, 760 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (distinguishing technical drawings (there, of
a recreational vehicle), which accord no protection in the vehicle itself, from
architectural plans, which accord protection in the completed structure under a
specific exception to the general rule).

696

71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 683 (2014)

copying it, but a 3D printer needs an electronic copy of a CAD file
to make the object.50 Thus, under the so-called MAI doctrine,
which states that even temporary versions in a computer’s
memory are potentially infringing copies, 3D printers are Merlins
rather than Sarumans.51 A CAD file is quite possibly protected
against unauthorized 3D printing, even where the resulting
object is not copyrightable.52
V.
One further concern is pragmatic rather than conceptual:
enforcement. Music and movies have had enforcement problems
in spades since Napster53 and its nephews. Now that the world of
bits is colonizing the world of atoms, the makers of things are
about to learn that they are less special than they may have
thought.54 They confront exactly the same enforcement
challenges: consumerized infringement-facilitating technologies;
all-but-undetectable end-user copying; and an instantaneous
worldwide distribution network. The 3D printer is the new CDROM drive.
50. See Dolinsky, supra note 2, at 600–02 (describing the 3D printing
process).
51. The doctrine takes its name from MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer,
Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993). But see Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC
Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 127–30 (2d Cir. 2008) (distinguishing MAI for
short-lived copies).
52. Another line of cases suggests that these intermediate copies might be
fair uses because they are mere way stations on the road to noninfringing final
uses. See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1525 (9th Cir.
1992) (finding fair use where “humans . . . cannot gain access to the unprotected
ideas . . . contained in [software] without . . . making copies”).
53. See A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001)
(agreeing with the district court that “Napster’s failure to police the system’s
‘premises,’ combined with a showing that Napster financially benefit[ted] from
the continuing availability of infringing files on its system, le[d] to the
imposition of vicarious liability”).
54. See Deven R. Desai & Gerard N. Magliocca, Patents, Meet Napster: 3D
Printing and the Digitization of Things, 102 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2014)
(manuscript at 27–32, 50–52), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2338067 (comparing the intellectual property problems posed
by 3D printing to other issues that courts have resolved in the past, and
proposing a “Patent and Trademark DMCA” to help manage 3D printing).
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The doctrinal details are daunting, from assessing whether a
wandmaker’s design has significant noninfringing uses55 to
checking scroll dealers’ compliance with the ins and outs of the
Digital Magic Copyright Act’s notice-and-takedown regime.56 But
copyright’s overall framework of secondary liability and statutory
remedies does not significantly change when file-sharers are
swapping magic spells or CAD files rather than episodes of Game
of Thrones.
VI. Conclusion
I have not rung all of the changes on these ideas that
Dolinsky does; he considers, in addition, the two-step process of
making scrolls from drawings, and the considerations that will
enter into case-by-case fair use determinations.57 But I take it
that he and I are in substantial agreement on the issues I have
described. That we have reached similar conclusions despite our
very different ways of approaching the problem strikes me as an
encouraging sign. Copyright law, we agree, still has a little magic
left in it.
It may be surprising that so little in copyright law needs to
change to accommodate 3D printers. But copyright law has long
been comfortable with 3D printing’s defining relationship
between ideas and items. For centuries, the metaphysical
magicians of copyright have drawn a sharp distinction between
tangible copies and intangible works.58 Printed objects are copies;

55. Cf. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456
(1984) (concluding that because Sony’s Betamax VCR was capable of substantial
noninfringing uses, Sony was not liable for contributory infringement).
56. Cf. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012) (requiring
online service providers to remove potentially infringing content if they receive
from the copyright owner a take-down notice that complies with statutory
requirements).
57. See Dolinsky, supra note 2, at 657–81 (discussing derivative works and
fair use in the context of 3D printing).
58. See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (“Transfer of ownership of any material object,
including the copy or phonorecord in which the work is first fixed, does not of
itself convey any rights in the copyrighted work embodied in the object.”).
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so too, are CAD files. Moving back and forth from one to the other
is just Transfiguration; the work’s identity remains.
The copy may disintegrate as the focus of copyright, and
perhaps should. But as long as there is something we can call
copyright, it will still summon up works of authorship from the
vasty deep. You cannot see, touch, or hear a work—only a
particular copy or performance of it. But copyright has no doubt
that works exist; they are immanent in every copy even as they
transcend this physical world. The foundation of copyright law is
the claim that this invisible essence can be reduced to ownership
by human hands. Is this magic, or magical thinking?

